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Abstract: Lawyers’ contingent fee (CF) rates are rather uniform, often one-third
of the recovery. Arguably, this uniformity is a type of anti-competitive price-
fixing, which results in clients paying supra-competitive fees. This paper chal-
lenges this argument. It shows that uniform CF rates provide clients with an
important advantage, as such rates enable them to make a de facto “take-it-or-
leave-it” offer. Consequently, lawyers cannot exploit their private information,
and clients retain the transaction’s entire surplus and may hire the best lawyer
among those who find it profitable to handle the case.
The paper also addresses the effect of uniformity of CF rates when lawyers
refer cases to other lawyers. It shows that uniformity facilitates matching of
clients and lawyers through the referral system. It also demonstrates that the
fact that both direct clients and those obtained through paid-for referrals pay the
same CF rate does not attest to cross-subsidization. The clients whose cases are
transferred for a referral fee (paid by the handling lawyer) “pay” for the referral
service by obtaining a less highly ranked lawyer.
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1 Introduction
Contingent fee (CF) arrangements are the standard method of financing civil
litigation in several types of suits, including those related to personal injury and
the collection of commercial and retail accounts. Under such arrangements, the
attorney’s fee is contingent on the success of the claim, calculated as a certain
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percentage of the amount recovered, and paid upon recovery. This practice
offers substantial advantages to plaintiffs. Since plaintiffs pay the fee only
upon recovery, CF arrangements provide them with credit (Schwartz and
Mitchell, 1970:1125-1126), thus considerably enhancing their access to the civil
justice system. These arrangements are particularly attractive to loss-averse
plaintiffs; unlike an hourly or a global fee, a CF does not expose them to the
risk of loss if the claim fails (Zamir and Ritov, 2010). It is also likely to yield
superior incentives for the lawyer, compared to hourly and global fees, both in
deciding whether to pursue the case (Dana and Spier, 1993) and in handling it
(see, e.g. Rickman, 1994; Polinsky and Rubinfeld, 2003).
CF arrangements are nevertheless highly controversial. A central criticism of
the CF practice focuses on the fact that CF rates in the United States are distinc-
tively, albeit not invariably, uniform. The conventional flat CF rate in the United
States is one-third of the recovery. According to Kritzer (2002), about two-thirds of
the cases (excluding those governed by special regulation) involve a fixed percen-
tage (flat fee); in 88% of these cases, the CF is 33% of the recovery. In cases
employing a variable percentage rather than a flat fee, the attorney will commonly
charge 25% of the recovery if the case does not go to trial or does not involve
substantial trial preparations; 33% if the case goes beyond this point and ends at
a trial-court decision; and 40–50% if the case results in an appeal (see also
Brickman, 2003a; Kritzer, 2004; Engstrom, 2011; Schwartz, 2012:360).
Arguably, this uniformity attests to collusion in the market, which often
results in clients paying supra-competitive fees (Schwartz and Mitchell, 1970;
Brickman, 1989, 2003b; Drummonds, 1993:891, n.123; Painter, 1995; Hadfield,
2000; Fisch, 2002:670-671; Swett, 2010:656-659). In a competitive market, one
would presumably expect CF rates to vary, as cases differ in terms of the costs of
providing the legal services (particularly the expected amount of work and the
attorney’s opportunity costs) and the expected value of the fee, determined by
the size of the claim and the prospects of winning it. It would seem that in a
competitive market plaintiff lawyers would not charge the same CF rate in small
and large cases and that top lawyers would charge higher rates than less-
qualified ones.
Additional evidence of the supra-competitive fees in the CF market, so it is
argued, is that lawyers who receive referrals from other lawyers, and pay referral
fees as high as one-third or one-half of the fee paid by the plaintiff (Spurr,
1988:100-102), charge the same CF rate in these cases as they charge when they
do not bear this extra cost. If clients always pay the same CF rate, then the
handling lawyer’s net fee in those cases which she obtains directly is much
higher than in cases referred to her by another lawyer (Brickman 1989:109,
2003b:88-89; Engstrom, 2011:865, n. 286).
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It is claimed that the CF market is not competitive due to clients’ acute
information problems (regarding the expected recovery, the risk involved in the
suit, the quality of legal services provided, and the time required to handle the
case), clients’ prohibitive search costs, and various means devised by lawyers to
inhibit competition (Brickman 1994, 2003b; Painter, 1995; Gross, 2006). These
means include uniform pricing practices, the absence of price advertisements,
and prohibitions against the purchase of tort claims and against brokerage of
lawyers’ services (Brickman, 2003b).
According to this common depiction, the uniformity of CF is harmful to
clients’ interests. We challenge this claim. We offer more innocuous explana-
tions for the uniformity of CF rates and argue that this uniformity is not
necessarily detrimental to clients. In fact, given their information problem, this
uniformity provides clients with significant advantages.
Uniform CF rates do not yield uniform expected fees, but differential ones,
depending on the scope of work and the expected recovery in each case. As long
as there is a “positive assortative matching” of cases and attorneys, such that
the best attorneys handle the most lucrative cases, the second-best attorneys
handle the second-most lucrative cases, and so forth, uniform CF rates will yield
effective fees that are correlated to the quality of legal services provided. The
uniformity of CF rates is thus pseudo-uniformity (Mnookin 1998:67-68).
As uniform CF rates yield varying effective fees, it is unlikely that this
uniformity is a product of market collusion. More importantly, and counter-
intuitively, we suggest that the uniformity of CF rates provides clients with an
important advantage. Since clients choose which lawyer to hire, the uniformity
of CF rates is tantamount to clients making a de facto “take-it-or-leave-it” offer.
The non-negotiability of the CF rate precludes lawyers from exploiting their
private information about the expected value of the lawsuit and the amount of
work it might entail. Clients with a good sense of the ranking of lawyers are able
to hire the best lawyer among the ones who are willing to handle the case. The
uniformity also enables the clients to retain the transaction’s entire surplus.
When clients lack information about lawyers’ ranking, matching is
advanced through the referral system. The uniformity of CF rates oils the wheels
of this referral system, especially when referral fees are also uniform. Finally, we
show that charging the same CF rate for cases which a lawyer gets directly as for
those she receives through paid-for referrals does not yield economic rents for
the lawyer, since the best-available lawyer hired through the referral system is
not as highly ranked as a lawyer hired directly. Consequently, each lawyer earns
a similar net fee in the two types of cases she handles, and the client whose case
was referred for a fee “pays” for this service by receiving poorer representation
than she would have received had she found the most suitable lawyer herself.
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We do not argue that uniform CF rates are necessarily superior to non-uni-
form CF rates, as some clients might have been better off with negotiable CF rates.
However, given the prevalent information asymmetry in the CF market, this
uniformity provides clients with significant advantages as compared to other
conceivable market schemes. While the combination of uniform CF rates and
the referral system has its pitfalls, it may well be the case that it better serves the
interests of clients and enhances aggregate social welfare as compared to alter-
native schemes, such as explicit brokerage in legal services without a uniform CF
rate. Given the clients’ information problem, a market with negotiable CF rates
may adversely affect both the interests of the clients and social welfare.
Some clarifications regarding the scope and objectives of this study are in
order. Different fee arrangements, such as a global fee, an hourly fee, and a CF,
have different incentive effects (e.g. Polinsky and Rubinfeld, 2003; Emons, 2006;
Hyde, 2006; Friehe and Baumann, 2012). These incentives are important because
attorneys’ efforts are largely unobservable and unverifiable. We will not discuss
these incentive effects in any detail, but rather take the choice of a CF arrange-
ment as given. In the same vein, we will not delve into the question of why CF
arrangements are particularly popular among personal-injury plaintiffs, while
remaining quite rare among defendants and in other spheres of legal represen-
tation (on the former puzzle, see Dana and Spier, 1993; Zamir and Ritov,
2010:275-281). Our analysis will, however, shed new light on these important
issues as well. Inasmuch as uniform CF rates assist clients who face serious
information problems, it is unsurprising that clients who do not face such
problems are much less inclined to use this fee arrangement.
Our analysis is potentially germane to other markets in which uniform CF
arrangements are prevalent, such as real-estate brokerage, underwriting, and
royalties. The analysis is also relevant to other markets where customers’ infor-
mation problems are (or can be) mitigated by keeping some variables constant
across all or most products. Limiting the dimensions of the transaction that
customers need to consider and compare when making their choices likely
ameliorates their decisions and enhances overall efficiency.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys some of the
related literature. Section 3 presents a model that illustrates how uniform CF
rates benefit clients and may facilitate matching of cases and attorneys when
clients know the ranking of prospective lawyers. Section 4 discusses the model’s
results based on empirical findings, and addresses its limitations. Section 5
relaxes the assumption regarding clients’ information about lawyers ranking
and explains how the matching of clients and lawyers is facilitated through
the combination of uniform CF rates and the referral system. It also points to the
shortcomings of this system. A conclusion follows.
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2 Related literature
A huge body of research has discussed the economics, sociology, psychology,
and ethics of the market for legal services in general, and the CF market in
particular (e.g. Spurr, 1987, 1988, 1990; Garicano and Santos, 2004; Kritzer,
2004; Parikh, 2001, 2006/2007; Zamir and Ritov, 2010, 2011; Brickman, 1989,
2003a, 2003b; Garoupa and Gomez-Pomar, 2008). Some of this research is
particularly relevant to the present analysis.
One group of studies claims that the uniformity of CF rates is largely a
product of lawyers’ practices and that this uniformity entails that clients pay
supra-competitive fees. Several commentators have argued that the uniformity
of CF rates is due to lawyers’ exploitation of clients’ information problems and
high search costs, exacerbated by lawyers’ uniform pricing policy and the
absence of price advertisements (Brickman, 1994, 2003b; Painter, 1995; Gross,
2006). It is, however, difficult to see how hundreds of thousands of lawyers
manage to coordinate and enforce relatively uniform CF rates to the detriment of
clients without any formal prohibitions on deviations from the standard CF rate.
Another group of studies explores the role of negotiable CF rates as a
signaling or a screening device. Daughety and Reinganum (2011) show that
offering different CF rates can serve lawyers as a signaling device regarding
their private information about the value of the lawsuit. Dana and Spier (1993)
similarly assume that lawyers compete for clients by offering different CF rates.
Rubinfeld and Scotchmer (1993) and Cotten and Santore (2012) present screening
models, in which lawyers have private information about their abilities, while all
other case attributes are common knowledge, and clients offer a single contract
that is acceptable only by a high-quality lawyer. A CF contract may thus provide
a mechanism for revealing the quality of an attorney by allowing contracts that
are only profitable to attorneys with a high likelihood of winning the case.
Cotten and Santore (2012) also show that restricting the possible values of CF
rates that a client can offer may prevent screening and reduce client welfare. A
common difficulty of these screening models is their unrealistic assumption that
clients have sufficient information about the expected value of their claim (and
the number of hours required to handle it) for each type of lawyer. While these
studies shed light on the CF market to the extent that CF rates are negotiable,
they disregard this market’s most salient feature, namely the distinctive, though
not invariable, uniformity of CF rates. This feature is the focus of our analysis.
The third group of articles analyzes some implications of the uniformity of
CF rates and comparable fee arrangements in other markets. Thus, Levmore
(1993) argues that uniform CF rates induce providers of services to efficiently
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allocate an appropriate amount of time to each assignment they undertake.
Garicano and Santos (2004) analyze the referral system, focusing on the incen-
tives for lawyers to refer cases to more-qualified colleagues under different
profit-sharing schemes. However, they discuss neither the role of clients in this
process nor the effect of the uniform CF rates on the matching of cases and
lawyers. Finally, Sykes (1993) argues that uniform brokerage fees assist property
owners in finding the most suitable broker for their property, based on the
listing price proposed by each broker. While Sykes’s analysis points to a linkage
between uniform fee rates and the matching of clients and service providers, his
mechanism is inapplicable to CF in the lawyers’ market, as lawyers do not
propose anything akin to a listing price. Thus, while the studies in this third
group discuss the same (or comparable) phenomenon as we do, they do so from
very different angles and under different assumptions.
A fourth group of studies consists of several works that theoretically and
empirically examine the pairing of clients and service providers in the under-
writing and investment markets. These examinations differ markedly from the
one we offer. For instance, Fernando et al. (2005) analyze assortative matching
of firms and underwriters, but fees do not play any role in their model. Chen and
Ritter (2000) argue that the high, uniform commissions paid to underwriters of
initial public offerings in the United States are supra-competitive and examine
several explanations for this fact (which differ from ours). The selection of
investment banks and the fees they charged were also empirically studied by
Dai and her co-authors (Dai et al., 2010).
While all of these studies shed important light on the CF market, none of
them provides a compelling positive or normative analysis of one of its salient
features: the uniformity of CF rates. As a first step in this direction, the next
section describes a simple model.
3 The model
The client, a would-be plaintiff, whom we initially assume is risk-neutral, wishes
to hire a lawyer on a CF basis to represent her in a lawsuit to recover some
damages. There are n lawyers, ranked according to their quality along a scale (1, 2,
… n), such that the higher the lawyer’s ranking i is, the more qualified she is.1 The
1 Note that the ranking of lawyers may – and usually does – depend on the type of claim. Thus,
Lawyer A may be ranked higher than Lawyer B in medical-malpractice cases while B is ranked
higher in car-accident cases. It follows that reciprocal referrals between two lawyers may both
be to a higher-ranking lawyer (Parikh, 2001:156-158). See also Section 5.2
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lawyer’s quality (and ranking) carries two implications. First, for a given lawsuit,
the more qualified a lawyer is, the higher the expected recovery (the amount
recovered multiplied by the probability of recovery).2 We assume, for simplicity,
that the lawyer’s quality does not affect the amount of work required for handling
the case, h (while we measure the amount of work by the working hours put into
the case, h can be understood as including other aspects of the lawyer’s invest-
ment in the case as well). For any given case, h is thus uniform across all lawyers.
It is further assumed that the CF scheme provides all lawyers with sufficient
incentive to invest this amount of work in the case should they decide to represent
the client. Second, the more qualified a lawyer is, the higher her hourly rate is.
The lawyer’s reservation hourly fee determines the minimum effective hourly fee
for which she is willing to take a case.
Thus, under a CF arrangement, the lawyer, who maximizes expected value,
calculates her effective hourly fee for each case, based on her expected benefit
and the amount of work it will require. The lawyer will be willing to take the
case if and only if it is expected to yield an effective hourly fee which is not
lower than her reservation price.
For a given lawsuit, denote:
– wi: Reservation (effective) hourly fee of lawyer i.
– h: Number of hours required to handle the lawsuit.
– pi: Probability of success if lawyer i handles the case and allocates h hours
to it.
– di: Value of recovery if the case is handled by lawyer i, provided she
allocates h hours to the case.
– r: CF rate.
If the client is fully informed, she can determine the optimal CF rate for the
specific contract, based on the following tradeoff: On one hand, the client
prefers a lower CF rate to save on attorney fees. On the other hand, a higher
rate would enable the client to hire a better lawyer (or any lawyer at all, if the
expected recovery is very small), and strengthen the lawyer’s incentive to attain
the best outcome. However, in practice, clients do not have sufficient bargaining
power to dictate the CF rate in their contract. More fundamentally, clients
typically are not sufficiently informed to determine what CF rate is optimal for
their case. Even if the client knows the general range of the expected value of
2 In fact, the expected recovery is determined by the distribution of the possible sums of
recovery. In a discrete setting, it is an aggregation of the products of each sum and the
likelihood of its recovery, and in a continuance setting, it is the integral over the probability
density function.
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her lawsuit, she is typically uninformed about the expected value of her lawsuit
if handled by each specific lawyer and about the amount of work it will require,
h. An evaluation of these values requires legal expertise that the client lacks, as
well as data about each lawyer’s specific characteristics, which is private,
unobservable information.
We initially assume, however, that the client does know the lawyers’ rank-
ing. Potential clients may be able to rank lawyers according to proxies, such as
how many associates she employs, where her offices are located, and (in the rare
instances this datum is available) her hourly fee. The model thus captures the
intermediate situation between the case in which the client has full information
about both her claim and different lawyers’ abilities (a rare possibility in the CF
market), and the case in which the client knows neither the expected value of
her claim nor the lawyers’ abilities (a state of affairs discussed in Section 5). We
also assume that clients do not face search costs.
Unlike the clients, we assume that the lawyers are fully informed.
Specifically, we assume that a lawyer can accurately evaluate the expected
value of the client’s lawsuit if handled by her, and the amount of work it will
require, h.3 We also assume that each attorney can handle all of the cases that
yield an effective fee which is at least equal to her reservation fee and does not
have to choose among them.4
Each lawyer thus faces the following lottery:
rdi  wih; pi;  wih; 1 pið Þ
with the expected value:
pi½rdi  wih  1 pið Þwih ¼ rpidi  wih




Assume first that CF rates are negotiable. Given our assumption about the
parties’ information, the lawyer has an incentive to take advantage of the would-
be client’s incomplete information by charging a CF rate that is likely to yield an
3 In the next section, we discuss the plausibility of this assumption, which is shared by others.
See, e.g., Dana and Spier (1993); Brickman (2003b:94-95); Daughety and Reinganum (2011).
4 This is a very plausible assumption, because the lawyer’s reservation hourly fee is not
exogenous, but determined according to the demand for her services. If the demand for the
services of a certain lawyer exceeds her capacity, one would expect her reservation hourly fee to
increase accordingly.
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effective hourly rate higher than her reservation hourly fee. Even if the client
knows that Lawyer A is better than Lawyer B, the client cannot rationally
compare Lawyer A’s offer to handle the case for a CF rate of a to Lawyer B’s
offer to take the case for a lower CF rate b. Therefore, it is not only the case that
the lawyer can charge a CF rate that yields an effective hourly rate higher than
her reservation hourly fee, but the client may also end up choosing Lawyer B
despite the fact that this alternative is suboptimal for the client.
Next, consider the case in which CF rates are uniform. The uniformity of
CF rates provides the client with the power to make what is in essence the
equivalent of a credible “take-it-or-leave-it” offer when choosing her attorney.
Lawyers are induced to accept the offer whenever the case generates an effective
hourly rate which is not lower than their reservation price. The uniformity of CF
rates thus prevents lawyers from taking advantage of clients’ information
problem.
Under the uniform CF rate, the more qualified her lawyer, the better off the
client, since moving up the ladder increases the client’s net expected recovery.
Given that the fee is calculated as a fixed rate of actual recovery, the client is
indifferent as to whether the marginal effect of hiring a more-qualified lawyer
(the increase of pidi as a result of a marginal increase in the lawyer’s quality) is
greater than the marginal increase in the wage (the increase in wih). Thus, the
optimal strategy of a client who knows lawyers’ rankings is to offer the case to
the highest-ranking lawyer; if she turns down the case, the client should offer it
to the next lawyer in rank, and so on, until she finds a lawyer willing to accept
it. Alternatively, the client could invite lawyers to bid for the case (for the
uniform CF rate) and choose the highest-ranked one to submit a bid.
The uniformity of the CF rate provides the client with the transaction’s entire
surplus. Consequently, except for extreme cases in which even the highest-
ranking lawyer is willing to take the case (and possibly earn a fee higher than
her reservation price), the uniformity of the CF rate enables the client to hire a
lawyer for a fee equal to the lawyer’s reservation hourly fee. To obtain the best
lawyer available, that is, the best lawyer among those whose reservation hourly
fee is lower than the effective hourly fee of the specific case, the client does not
have to know the net expected value of the lawsuit under each lawyer; all she
needs to know is the lawyer’s ranking.
The result is a “positive assortative matching.” As indicated above, in such
equilibrium, the uniform CF rate does not yield uniform fees to different lawyers.
Lawyers and cases are matched such that the effective hourly rate in all the
cases a lawyer handles is equal to the lawyer’s reservation hourly fee. Thus, for
the given CF rate (e.g. one-third of the recovery), each lawyer has her own set of
cases, and clients are induced to search for this lawyer to achieve the best
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matching.5 Good lawyers are hired to handle cases which yield high effective
hourly fees, and lesser lawyers handle lower-value cases. The uniform CF rate
may be different than the optimal one given the client’s specific preferences.
However, in light of the information asymmetry, from the clients’ perspective a
uniform CF rate may well be a second-best solution.6
4 Discussion
This section discusses empirical findings that support the model’s assumptions
and predictions, as well as the model’s limitations.
4.1 Matching and heterogenic effective fees – empirical
findings
Uniform CF rates would be a mystery if all cases were similar while lawyers
varied in the quality of the services they provide. In the same vein, uniform CF
rates would be puzzling if all lawyers were equally qualified while cases varied
in their expected recovery. However, since both the value of cases and the
qualification of lawyers are heterogeneous, uniform CF rates do not yield uni-
form effective fees (cf. Dai et al., 2010). If better lawyers handle more lucrative
cases, uniform CF rates actually entail systematic differentiation in attorneys’
fees (cf. Mnookin, 1998:367-368). In this equilibrium, plaintiffs with particularly
strong cases, where the anticipated recovery is particularly large, are matched
with more skilled lawyers, who can obtain for the client a higher expected value;
plaintiffs with the second-most lucrative cases pair with second-best lawyers;
and so forth. The high value of the case is likely to result in an especially large
fee for the top lawyer, and the high quality of legal services is expected to result
in a particularly large net recovery for the plaintiff with the lucrative case,
without deviating from the standard CF rate. At the other end of the scale,
5 A comparable claim can be made regarding any sub-market in which lawyers charge other
uniform CF rates, such as a non-negotiable variable fee depending on how the case is resolved
(e.g. 25% if it is settled without trial, 33% if it goes to trial, and 40% if there is an appeal),
provided that the probability of settling/trial/appeal is uniform for all attorneys.
6 Note that this result differs from the standard result in the literature regarding two-party
negotiation under asymmetric information. According to the standard result, efficiency requires
that the informed, rather than the uninformed, party would make the contract offer (e.g. Wang,
1998; Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005:243).
366 E. Zamir et al.
Brought to you by | University of Warwick
Authenticated
Download Date | 2/5/15 3:40 PM
low-quality cases are expected to match with low-quality lawyers, thus yielding
a smaller net recovery for the plaintiff and a minimal fee for the lawyer.7 In such
a market, the uniformity of fees is nothing but an optical illusion. In fact, the
effective fees in the CF market may be as varied, and possibly more varied, than
the hourly and global fees in other markets.
The hypothesis that the CF market is characterized by this type of “positive
assortative matching” is supported by a large-scale study of Texas plaintiff
lawyers conducted by Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin. Daniels and Martin
(2002) describe a hierarchical plaintiff bar. The “Bread and Butter” lawyers at
the bottom of this hierarchy ordinarily deal with low-value cases, while the
“Heavy Hitters” at the top handle very large cases. Sara Parikh (2001:59-61)
provides a comparable description of the CF market in Chicago. The lawyers in
these categories, as well as the intermediate ones, differ with regard to the
mean value of the cases they handle, with the mean and median cases ranging
from several thousand dollars to several million. These categories also differ
with regard to the scope of the geographic market the lawyers serve (local,
regional, or state/national) and the percentage of potential clients they turn
away.
Moreover, the empirical findings also support the bargaining process
described by our model, given a uniform CF rate. According to Daniels and
Martin (2002:1789), while the Bread and Butter lawyers in their sample signed a
CF contract with 35.1% of their potential clients (the median being 30%), those
at the top contracted with only 17.9% (with a median of 10%). A similar pattern
emerges from Parikh’s (2001:75-78) empirical study. While “low-end” practi-
tioners who handle personal injuries in Chicago accepted 49% of the cases
they screened, “high-end” (the top 19%) and “elite” (top 1%) practitioners
accepted 36% and 24%, respectively (see also Schwartz, 2012:357-371). The
very high rate of rejection by top lawyers (more than four-fifths or three-fourths
of potential clients, according to these studies) and the slightly smaller rejection
rate of the next tier of practitioners (about two-thirds according to Parikh’s data)
dovetail with our model. Some potential clients do seem to have a good sense of
the relative quality of lawyers. These individuals sensibly try to hire the top
lawyers, and when they are turned down because their case is not lucrative
enough, they approach lower-ranked lawyers, until they find an attorney willing
to handle the case.
7 This insight, originally offered by Zamir and Ritov (2008), was endorsed by Furgeson
(2009:824) and Gryphon (2011).
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4.2 Information asymmetry
Some studies assume that potential clients are fully informed about the merits of
their case (e.g. Rubinfeld and Scotchmer, 1993; Cotten and Santore, 2012).
Contrary to these studies, and following others (e.g. Dana and Spier, 1993;
Brickman, 2003b:94-95; Daughety and Reinganum 2011), our model assumes
that lawyers are much more knowledgeable than clients not only regarding the
services they provide but also regarding the merits of the client’s case. We
believe this assumption is much more realistic.
Indeed, prior to the initial interview, usually the client has private informa-
tion about the circumstances and outcomes of her injury, while the lawyer is
much more knowledgeable about the pertinent legal rules and about her ser-
vices. By the end of the interview, however, and prior to concluding the repre-
sentation agreement, the lawyer is likely more knowledgeable than the client not
only regarding her services, but also regarding the merits of the case and the
potential recovery.
At the contracting stage, both the lawyer and the client may wish to convey
information to each other in a way that would improve their bargaining position.
For instance, a client who strives to convince a high-quality lawyer to take her
case may overstate the severity of her injury and understate the contribution of
her fault to the accident. A lawyer may overstate the complexity of the case and
underestimate the probability of winning it. There is, however, an important
difference between the parties in terms of their ability to hide or misrepresent
information. Typically, the scope of the lawyer’s work and the ex ante prob-
ability of winning the case will remain unobservable and unverifiable through-
out the parties’ relationship, hence the lawyer can easily manipulate this
information. In contrast, the details concerning the scope of injury and the
circumstances of the accident are expected to be revealed subsequently if the
lawyer accepts the case, hence the client knows that she cannot overly misstate
the facts. The lawyer’s superior experience and expertise enable her to extract
the pertinent information from the client much more than the client is able to
obtain the necessary information from the lawyer.
These observations are more plausible when clients are unsophisticated,
single-shot players, than when they are sophisticated, repeat players. These
observations explain why uniform CF rates, and the very use of CF arrangements,
are considerably less common among corporate clients (plaintiffs and defen-
dants), who typically know more about the merits of their case and can better
monitor the attorney’s efforts. In addition, while our model assumes absolute
uniformity of CF rates, in reality there are some deviations from the standard rate.
Plausibly these are the cases in which clients are particularly well informed.
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4.3 Stability of the equilibrium
A difficult question is what prevents the parties from deviating from the uniform
CF rate. Such deviations may be mutually beneficial. A lawyer would presum-
ably find it advantageous to take a particularly lucrative case at a lower-than-
standard CF rate, lest the client go elsewhere. At the same time, a client might
find it advantageous to offer a higher-than-standard CF rate to induce a certain
lawyer to take a case she would not otherwise take. As indicated, we do not rule
out this possibility of deviation from the standard one-third CF rate, and indeed,
some deviations do exist. Nevertheless, there are relatively few such deviations,
and our model helps to understand this reality.
To begin with, several factors constrain the range of mutually beneficial
possible CF rates. An overly low CF rate might dilute the lawyer’s monetary
incentive to attain the best outcome (on the incentive effects of CF arrange-
ments, see, e.g. Schwartz and Mitchell, 1970; Miller, 1987; Thomason, 1991;
Rickman, 1994; Polinsky and Rubinfeld, 2003; McKee et al., 2007). At the same
time, there may be a “fairness constraint” on charging very high CF rates (Zamir
and Ritov, 2011). The specter of a possible regulatory intervention may also
induce lawyers to avoid very high CF rates (Brickman, 2003b; Zamir and Ritov,
2011:27-29). Within these constraints, it is not surprising that the standard flat CF
rate is 1/3, a fraction with a small denominator that is a natural focal point
(Shelling, 1960:67).8 This is particularly true given both the relational character
of the client–lawyer contract, where the reduction of confrontations in bargain-
ing is particularly important (Bernstein, 1993:70),9 and the futility of trying to
negotiate a slightly higher or lower CF rate when the costs and prospects of the
case cannot be calculated with much precision ex ante. Finally, as further
explained below, lawyers have an interest in keeping the CF rates uniform, as
this uniformity facilitates the referral system, because unsophisticated clients
tend to assume that they can only gain from a referral: paying the same exact fee
to secure the services of a better lawyer.10
Given the limited range of mutually beneficial CF rates and the behavioral
and other factors that make one-third a natural focal point, some deviations
8 The same tendency is manifest in variable-percentage CF rates, where the common pattern is
a scale of rates of 1/4, 1/3, and 2/5 or 1/2, depending on the stage to which the case gets. It is
also manifest in the common referral fees, where, according to one study, some 80% of the
negotiated referral fee rates are either one-third or one-half of the handling lawyer’s fee (Spurr,
1988:100-102).
9 In Kritzer’s survey, 25% of the individual clients and 33% of the organizational ones reported
that fees were not discussed at all with the lawyer prior to receiving the bill (Kritzer, 1990:57).
10 See Section 5.1. In Section 5.5., we will explain why this naïve assumption is problematic.
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from this standard may nevertheless seem attractive to the parties and thus
merit consideration. Clearly, a lawyer has no incentive to offer a CF rate lower
than one-third if it would yield an effective hourly fee that is lower than her
reservation price. A more difficult question is what will be the result if a lawyer
offers to handle a case for a lower-than-standard rate when a higher-ranking
lawyer would be willing to accept the same case for the standard rate. If
successful, this strategy may result in an effective hourly fee that is higher
than her reservation price. Attorneys who do not know whether the client is
aware of their ranking would, however, be reluctant to offer a lower-than-
standard CF rate because this would indicate that they are less qualified than
their colleagues – a message they would be loath to send (Silver, 2002;
Brickman, 2003:101-102). Moreover, clients are unlikely to accept such offers
anyway. As indicated, clients are typically unable to assess the expected value
of their claim and the expertise it might require. As a result, they cannot
tell whether it is preferable to engage a higher-ranking lawyer for a CF rate of
one-third or a lower-ranking one for a lower rate.
While this incomparability makes it difficult to predict the client’s choice,
there are several reasons to assume that clients would rarely opt for the lower-
ranked lawyer charging the lower-than-standard CF rate. First, hiring a better
lawyer plausibly entails not only a higher expected recovery but also a higher
likelihood of winning the case. Hence, risk-averse clients (as single-shot perso-
nal-injury plaintiffs usually are) are likely to prefer the better lawyer, who
charges the standard rate.11 Second, people tend to assume that the prevailing
rate is reasonable. They treat the common fee as a benchmark for judging
fairness (Brickman, 2003b:99; cf. Zamir, 1997:1758-1759) and feel secure in the
knowledge that their agreement conforms to the prevailing norm (Epstein,
1992:10). The more widespread the adherence to a background norm, the likelier
it is that a suggestion to deviate from it will make the other party suspect hidden
motives (Ben-Shahar and Pottow, 2006:667). Third, the standard CF rate likely
11 To see why, suppose that the expected returns to the client from the two lawyers are the
same. Specifically, denote by k the CF rate, p the probability of success, and d the amount of
recovery. The client’s expected return from the better lawyer is (1–k)pd while the expected
return from the lower-ranked lawyer who charges a lower CF rate is (1–k’)p’d’, where k > k’,
p > p’, and d > d’. Assuming, without loss of generality, u(0) ¼ 0, we obtain that the expected
utilities of the two returns are pu((1–k)d) and p’u((1–k’)d’). We assume that (1–k)pd ¼ (1–k’)p’d’.
It follows that p’ ¼ (1–k)pd/(1–k’)d’, and the expected utility of hiring the lower-ranked lawyer
becomes (1–k)pdu((1–k’)d’)/(1–k’)d’. The expected utility from the better lawyer is higher than
that from the other lawyer iff uðð1kÞdÞð1kÞd >
uðð1k0Þd0Þ
ð1k0Þd0
This inequality holds because by (1–k)pd ¼ (1–k’)p’d’, together with p > p’, we obtain that
(1–k)d < (1–k’)d’, and since u is concave and u(0) ¼ 0, the ratio u(x)/x decreases with x.
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creates a default effect, that is, a tendency not to opt out of default arrange-
ments, whether or not one judges them to be fair (see generally Zamir, 1997;
Korobkin, 1998; Madrian and Shea, 2001; DellaVigna, 2009:322-323). This phe-
nomenon is particularly manifest when people face choices involving risk or
uncertainty (e.g. Bar-Hillel and Neter, 1996), as is the case in the present context:
a lower CF rate may either increase the client’s net recovery (because her share
will be larger), or decrease it (because the gross recovery might be smaller due to
the dilution of the lawyer’s incentive) (see, e.g. Santore and Viard, 2001:550).
4.4 Risk aversion
Our model assumes that both lawyers and clients are risk-neutral. The assump-
tion that lawyers working on a CF basis are risk-neutral is plausible since they
handle many cases. In contrast, since clients in the CF market are usually private
people who are single-shot players, they are more plausibly risk-averse. In fact,
risk-shifting is one of the basic justifications for the CF arrangement (Brickman,
1989; Kritzer, 2004; Posner, 2007:613-614).
If the client and lawyer differ in their attitude to risk, the strategy of
choosing the best lawyer willing to handle the case for the standard CF rate
may be less than optimal for clients. Risk-neutral lawyers decide whether to take
a case according to its expected value, pidi. However, a risk-averse client may
prefer an increase in the probability of recovery even if this entails a decrease in
the expected recovery. Choosing the highest-ranked lawyer willing to take the
case thus maximizes the client’s expected value, but not necessarily her
expected utility.12
It seems, however, that this concern is mostly theoretical. For one thing, it
stands to reason that a higher-ranking lawyer will be better not only at achieving
a higher expected recovery, but also at assuring a higher likelihood of winning
the case or attaining a favorable settlement. For another, assuming decreasing
marginal productivity of the time and effort a lawyer puts into a case
12 For instance, hiring a particular lawyer may yield a relatively low p and high d, whereas
hiring a less-qualified lawyer would yield a lower expected value p’d’ < pd, but may result in
higher probability of winning the case (p’ > p), which might be sufficient to compensate the
risk-averse client for the lower expected value. In addition, a risk-averse plaintiff may be more
interested in establishing the defendant’s liability than in the scope of damages awarded, and if
a particular lawyer is better at attaining high damages once liability is determined, but not in
proving liability, the client may be better off with someone else.
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(appreciably, beyond a certain minimum), a CF arrangement is likely to induce
lawyers to accept settlement offers rather than invest additional time and effort
in trying to attain a higher recovery. This is because under the standard CF rate,
the lawyer recoups only one-third of the added value of any additional hour she
puts into the case (Schwartz and Mitchell, 1970; Miller, 1987; Thomason, 1991;
Rickman, 1994:43-45). Under CF arrangements, lawyers are thus expected to act
rather cautiously, a tendency that is likely to accord with the preferences of
a risk-averse client. This incentive effect of the CF arrangement plausibly
narrows the possible gap between the parties’ risk aversion (and may even
reverse it).
4.5 Varying the amount of work
The argument that uniform CF rates induce a desirable matching is based on the
assumption that all lawyers expect to invest the same amount of work, h, in
handling the case.13 This assumption guarantees that the lawyers’ ranking
according to wi corresponds to the expected value of the case, pidi.
14 While the
uniformity of CF rates ensures that the lawyer would not have an incentive to
suboptimally allocate her time and effort among the cases she handles
(Levmore, 1993:505-511), it does not rule out the possibility that different lawyers
would optimally spend varying amounts of time and effort on the same case.
In particular, it is possible that a more-qualified lawyer would prefer to
invest fewer resources in the case (and thus generate a lower expected value
for the client) than a lower-ranking lawyer would. If so, the client would not
be able to rely on lawyers’ ranking, but instead would have to calculate the
value of pidi(hi*) for each lawyer (where hi* is the amount of work a lawyer i is
expected to invest in the case).15 Potential clients do not typically possess the
information necessary for such a calculation. Here, too, however, it seems
plausible that given the incentive effects of a uniform CF rate, the clients’
assumption that a more-qualified lawyer would attain a larger recovery is
quite reasonable.
13 The actual scope of work required ex post may of course differ from the scope expected ex
ante, but since there is no difference in this respect between negotiated and uniform CF rates,
the model assumes away this possibility.
14 Conceivably, the ranking would have been different had the pricing scheme, and thus the
incentives it provides, been different.
15 This is especially true if the lawyer’s input includes not only hours of work but also other
aspects of her “production function,” which are often unobservable.
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4.6 Search costs
Contrary to the model’s assumption, search costs are never actually zero. These
costs are nevertheless quite low, since lawyers do not ordinarily charge clients
for reviewing a case before deciding whether to accept it. Often, it takes the
client just a phone call to realize that she aimed too high in her search for an
appropriate lawyer (Kritzer, 2004:76-89). Introducing search costs to the model
would provide lawyers with some bargaining power. Thus, in certain instances
lawyers would be able to extract effective hourly fees that exceed their reserva-
tion value, and the client might not be able to hire the best-available lawyer.
However, as long as search costs are not prohibitively high, our results hold.
4.7 Clients’ knowledge of lawyers’ ranking
The strongest assumption of the model is that potential plaintiffs possess com-
plete information about the ranking of all lawyers. While this assumption might
be true for particularly knowledgeable clients, it does not hold for most unso-
phisticated, one-shot plaintiffs. Section 5 will analyze the referral mechanism
through which unsophisticated clients are matched with lawyers. However, it is
worth noting that this limitation of our model is plausibly less dramatic than this
critique implies. It stands to reason that for most cases, small differences in
lawyers’ qualifications would have very little effect on the plaintiff’s recovery.
Consequently, to attain the desirable matching, suffice it that the potential
plaintiff can rank a limited number of lawyers into a limited number of quality
groups. The fact that for many claims different lawyers may be equally effective
thus does not weaken the force of our argument; it strengthens it.
4.8 Efficiency
The model assumes that for a given lawsuit, the more qualified the lawyer, the
higher the expected recovery. While this assumption is sufficient to ensure that
the client would hire the best-available lawyer, it does not guarantee that the
ensuing matching would maximize overall social welfare. Two concerns should
be addressed. First, from a social point of view, the optimal lawyer to handle a
given lawsuit is not necessarily the one who would obtain the highest expected
recovery, but rather the highest expected net value. Assume, for instance, that
Lawyer A’s reservation fee is $300, and that if she were to handle the case, the
expected recovery would be $900. Lawyer B’s reservation fee is $150, and if she
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were to take the case, the expected recovery would be $800. Given a CF pricing
scheme, the client is clearly better off hiring Lawyer A, who would agree to take
the case at the standard CF rate of one-third. However, the efficient outcome is
to assign Lawyer B to the case, as this would yield a higher expected net value
($650 with Lawyer B vs $600 with Lawyer A). Thus, a matching is socially
optimal only if the marginal productivity of quality (the increase in expected
recovery when a better lawyer handles the case) is not only positive but also
higher than its marginal cost (the increase in the lawyer’s reservation fee when a
more-qualified lawyer is hired). When this assumption does not hold, the uni-
form CF rate may be in the best interest of the client, but is not necessarily the
socially optimal option.
A second concern from a social welfare perspective has to do with which
cases attorneys choose to handle. Suppose, for example, that the expected
recovery in case A is higher than in case B, but the quality of the lawyer will
have a greater impact on the expected recovery in case B (since, for instance,
establishing liability requires especially finely honed legal skills) (cf. Mnookin,
1998:368). If case A is expected to yield an effective hourly fee at least equal to
the lawyer’s reservation fee, while case B is expected to yield an effective hourly
fee lower than her reservation fee, then given the uniformity of the CF rate, she
would accept case A and turn down case B. She would do so even if from a
social perspective she could add more value to case B.16 Here again, the attained
matching does not induce the most efficient outcome. However, it is unclear that
absent a uniform CF rate, client B – who is presumably neither conversant with
the expected value of her lawsuit if handled by each lawyer nor aware of how
much work her case will require – would be willing to pay a higher CF rate to
attain a better lawyer, as she cannot know whether hiring the better lawyer
would indeed result in a higher net recovery. Instituting a negotiable CF rate
market would not eliminate this inefficiency.
Despite the limitations of the basic model’s assumptions – that clients are
risk-neutral and that different lawyers would put the same amount of time and
effort into the same case – the empirical findings described in Section 4.1 seem
to indicate that our model adequately captures some aspects of the CF market.
The central limitation of the model lies, however, with its assumption that
potential plaintiffs know the ranking of the attorneys who are appropriate for
their case. Very often, this is not true. Potential plaintiffs who lack this informa-
tion may be assisted by people who possess it (and possibly have the additional
16 If both cases are expected to yield an effective hourly rate that is not lower than the
attorney’s reservation price, then it may reasonably be assumed that she will accept both. See
supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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information necessary to choose the optimal lawyer given varying h) – namely,
other lawyers. The next section will analyze the mechanism through which
clients may obtain this assistance (and sometimes pay for it): the referral system.
5 Uniform contingent-fee rates and referrals
5.1 General
The above analysis assumed that clients are aware of lawyers’ ranking. Often
this is not the case, as the majority of tort plaintiffs are single-shot players who
are unfamiliar with the pertinent legal-services market. Such plaintiffs may
benefit from transferring their case from the lawyer they initially approached
to a more suitable one. The raison d’être of the referral mechanism is to
compensate for the typical client’s lack of knowledge about lawyers and the
value of her own case. Referring lawyers are considerably more knowledgeable
than laypeople when it comes to other lawyers’ capabilities and the potential
value of cases (Spurr, 1988; Parikh, 2001:59, 120, 170, 2006/2007:252, 257; see
also Abel, 2006/7:351-352, 355).
Empirical studies show that while most clients in the CF market find an
attorney by themselves, many – especially those who want to put their case in
the hands of a high-quality, expert attorney – rely on referrals. According to
Daniels and Martin (2002:1783-1795), while the Bread and Butter lawyers acquire
20% of their clients through referrals from other lawyers, the Heavy Hitters
acquire most of their clients (55.3%) this way. In the same vein, Parikh estimated
that “[f]or attorneys in the low-end sector, about one-third of their business
comes from other attorneys. By contrast, attorney referral generates about two-
thirds of the business for attorneys in the high-end and elite sectors” (Parikh,
2006/2007:254). Similarly, in Spurr’s (1988:94) sample, high-quality lawyers
obtained 52% of their cases from other lawyers, as compared to an average of
27% in the entire sample (see also Daniels and Martin, 1999:385-388). Although
attorney referrals play a greater role in the practice of high-end lawyers, these
lawyers will sometimes refer low-value cases to low-end lawyers (Parikh, 2006/
2007:248).
The uniformity of CF rates fosters the referral system by assuring clients that
they will not have to pay a higher fee if their case is transferred to a more
suitable lawyer. Unsophisticated clients likely assume that the referral only
affects the handling lawyer’s fee, not their own net recovery. While attorneys
presumably inform clients about fee splitting (Rule 1.5(e)(2) of the ABA Model
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Rules of Professional Conduct (2002)), clients may assume that since the referral
fee is paid out of the handling lawyer’s share of the recovery, it does not affect
their own net recovery. Were CF rates negotiable, clients would sensibly worry
that if the case is transferred, they would have to pay a higher fee. Moreover,
were it considered legitimate to charge higher CF rates when the case is trans-
ferred, even equally qualified attorneys would find it profitable to reciprocally
refer cases of uninformed clients, thus charging higher total fees. Lawyers who
benefit from the referral system thus generally have an interest in maintaining
the standard rates.
For the reasons discussed below, the naïve assumption that the client can
only gain from the referral when CF rates are uniform is incorrect. Nevertheless,
we claim that this scheme has important advantages for clients. This section
discusses the advantages and pitfalls of the referral system when CF rates are
uniform. It concludes that while the referral system with uniform CF rates is a
second-best solution for the clients’ lack of information, this system is not
necessarily inferior to other conceivable solutions, such as a ban on fee splitting,
varying CF rates, and other mechanisms of brokerage in legal services.
The referrals practice is not uniform. A significant number of referrals, in
particular top-down ones, are done for no fee (see Section 5.4). When a referral
involves fee splitting, the fee is calculated as a certain percentage of the hand-
ling lawyer’s net recovery. In the United States, the referral fee is ordinarily
negotiated between the referring and handling lawyers and is usually one-third
or one-half of the latter’s fee (Spurr, 1988; Parikh, 2001; Brickman, 1989:109,
2003b:88-89). In other legal systems, such as Israel, referral fees are (or at least
used to be) rather uniform: ordinarily one-third of the CF. In what follows we
will briefly analyze these three schemes in reverse order: starting from a uniform
referral fee and ending with unpaid-for referrals. We will also challenge the
claim that the uniformity of CF rates paid by clients whose cases were trans-
ferred for a referral fee and those who found a suitable attorney on their own
indicates that the standard rate is supra-competitive, at least for the latter
(Brickman, 2003b:88-89).
5.2 Uniform referral fees
When both CF rates and referral fee rates are uniform, the matching process
modeled in Section 3 applies mutatis mutandis. The client, who does not know
lawyers’ ranking, is assisted by the referring lawyer, who does. The referring
lawyer finds the best attorney willing to handle the case for the standard CF rate
minus the standard referral fee rate. This mechanism is expected to function
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regardless of whether the transfer is up or down the scale. The referring lawyer is
making a de facto “take-it-or-leave-it” offer to potential handling lawyers, trans-
ferring the case to the highest-ranking lawyer who agrees to take it on.
To identify the conditions under which such transfers are likely to occur, the
following model analyzes the lawyers’ behavior in a market where both CF rates
and referral fees are uniform. Without loss of generality, assume that the uni-
form CF rate is one-third of the recovery and the uniform referral fee is one-third
of the CF (that is, the handling lawyer gets two-ninths of the recovery and the
transferring lawyer one-ninth). Following the above notations, for a case to be
transferred two conditions must be met. First, the would-be transferring lawyer
would transfer it iff:
pidi
3
 wih  pjdj9 ½1
where i is the transferring lawyer and j is the prospective handling lawyer. The
handling lawyer would be willing to accept the case iff:
2pjdj
9
 wjh  0 ½2
First, consider referrals to a more-qualified lawyer. It is clearly in the client’s
interest that a case be transferred to a better lawyer who is willing to handle it,
whenever such a person exists. This outcome is obtained when both conditions
are met. Condition [1] is met when the lawyer’s expected profit from handling
the case is lower than one-ninth of the expected recovery if the case is handled
by the transferee. In these circumstances, the lawyer has an incentive to transfer
the case to the best-available lawyer, as this would maximize her own expected
referral fee (as well as the client’s net expected recovery). When condition [2] is
met for some j > i, the desirable transfer will take place.
The referral system imposes an additional cost of the referral fee of one-
ninth. This is a direct cost, tantamount to that of brokerage fees. Consequently,
the best lawyer who would have been willing to take a case for one-third of the
recovery would not take it for two-ninths, and the case would instead go to a
lower-ranking lawyer. Another constraint is that if condition [1] is not met, the
would-be transferring lawyer would find it unprofitable to transfer the case,
although there is a better lawyer j that would have been willing to handle the
case and increase the client’s net recovery.
Next, consider transfers to a less-qualified attorney. If the client’s first-
choice lawyer is unwilling to take the case, clearly no higher-ranking lawyer
would take it, and the desired course of action is to transfer the case to a lower-
ranking lawyer. Here, too, two problems may arise. First, the pool of would-be
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transferees is limited, since their expected net fee is only two-ninths of the
recovery, rather than one-third. Accordingly, the lawyer who agrees to take the
case will have a lower ranking than the lawyer the client could have hired
without a referral. Second, even though the transferring lawyer could handle
the case herself, she may prefer to refer the case to a less capable colleague. This
would occur whenever the expected referral fee is higher than the transferring
lawyer’s net gain from handling the case. As a matter of fact, top-down referrals
often involve no fee splitting (see Section 5.6).
To these advantages and limitations, one should add the incentive effects of
fee splitting. A conspicuous disadvantage of fee splitting is that it dilutes the
handling lawyer’s monetary incentive to attain the best outcome for the client.
Under a CF arrangement, the lawyer recoups only a portion of the added value
of any additional hour she puts into the case, rather than the entire added value.
The smaller this portion, the earlier the point at which the lawyer would find it
unprofitable to put extra effort into the case. A net fee of two-ninths of the
recovery provides a weaker incentive for the handling lawyer than the standard
one-third.
The involvement of the referring lawyer may, however, mitigate this pro-
blem. The referring lawyer is typically a repeat player in the referral market and
is considerably more knowledgeable than the typical client. Since her referral fee
is a function of the sum recovered, she has an incentive to monitor the handling
lawyer’s performance. If the recovery seems unduly low, she might not refer
future cases to the same attorney, thus providing the handling lawyer with an
incentive to invest extra effort in the case.17 Sometimes, the referring lawyer has
ongoing relationships not only with the handling lawyer but also with the client,
to whom she provides other legal services. If the client is ill-treated by the
handling lawyer, she is liable to hold this against the referring lawyer and
look for another lawyer for all of her legal needs. The transferring lawyer thus
has a double incentive to choose the most suitable lawyer and monitor her
performance (Spurr, 1988; Parikh, 2001; Kritzer, 2004:61).
This analysis also applies when the referring lawyer has a different specia-
lization than the handling lawyer, for example, if she is a real-estate lawyer who
had represented the client in a land transaction (Parikh, 2001; Kritzer, 2004:59).
A conspicuous advantage of a referral by a lawyer outside of the pertinent
ranking is that handling the case is not a viable option for her. Hence, the
17 At least in theory, the incentive created by the ongoing relationship between the referring
and the handling lawyers may outweigh the reduction in incentives due to fee splitting – in
which case finding an appropriate lawyer through a referral may be advisable even if the client
is knowledgeable about lawyers’ ranking.
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referring lawyer has a monetary incentive to refer the case to the best-available
attorney willing to handle the case for an effective fee of two-ninths of the
recovery, regardless of whether the reservation hourly fee of that attorney is
higher, lower, or equal to her own reservation price. The downside of a referral
by a lawyer with a different specialization is that she might not be as capable of
monitoring the handling lawyer’s performance as a referring lawyer who han-
dles similar cases would be.
Compared to referrals by non-legally-trained brokers, the current referral
system thus has several advantages. First, the typical single-shot personal-injury
plaintiff may not know whether she needs a referral. Approaching a lawyer who
might or might not handle the case herself saves on referral fees whenever that
lawyer is actually suited to handle the case. This is a considerable advantage
given that most cases are not transferred.18 Second, a legally-trained transferor
is far better able to monitor the handling lawyer than a broker with no such
training, and if the former has ongoing relationships with the client, she also has
a stronger incentive to engage in such monitoring. While these arguments may
not justify the prohibition on brokerage in legal services by non-lawyers, they do
point to advantages of the current system. In any case, as far as we can see,
there is no necessary connection between the uniformity of CF rates and the
availability of such brokerage services.
Compared to a system where referral fees are prohibited, the fee-splitting
system creates a much stronger incentive to transfer the case when the original
lawyer is not well-suited to handle it. Absent referral fees, utility-maximizing
lawyers would prefer to handle such cases by themselves, notwithstanding their
knowledge that other lawyers could attain a much higher expected net recovery
for the client.
5.3 Non-uniform referral fees
Some of the above arguments apply to markets in which CF rates are uniform
but referral fees are non-uniform, which is the case for much of the CF market in
the United States (Spurr, 1988). The concern that the payment of a referral fee
narrows the pool of lawyers who might be willing to handle the case as well as
the worry that it dilutes the handling lawyer’s incentive to attain the best out-
come also apply when referral fees are negotiable. The same is true for the
18 As detailed in Section 5.1, while top lawyers obtain most of their cases through referrals, the
majority of lawyers, who handle the lion’s share of the CF cases, obtain most of their cases
directly.
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arguments regarding the transferring lawyer’s ability and incentive to monitor
the handling lawyer. Negotiating for a lower referral fee would reduce the
magnitude of the former concerns, yet diminish the referring lawyer’s incentive
to look for the best-suited attorney and monitor her performance. Negotiating a
higher referral fee would have the opposite effects.
The main difference between uniform and negotiable referral fees is that,
once referral fees are negotiable, the advantage of uniform CF rates in terms of
inducing desirable matching no longer exists. When the referral fee is negoti-
able, the transferring lawyer’s ability to make a credible “take-it-or-leave-it”
offer to the potential transferee is considerably diminished. Inasmuch as the
interests of the two lawyers are involved, this may not be a serious concern, as
the referring lawyer is often capable of assessing not only the ranking of lawyers
but also the scope and probability of recovery and the amount of work the case
is likely to require. In fact, when both parties are fully informed, negotiable
referral fees are superior to uniform ones. However, the negotiability of the
referral fee means that the interests of the client and the referring lawyer may
diverge. A transferring lawyer whose referral fee is negotiable may transfer the
case to an attorney who offers her a larger referral fee, even if the latter is not the
best-available lawyer for the case (Pauly, 1979; Gilson, 1990:896).
It may still be the case, however, that uniform CF rates with negotiable
referral fees are superior to a system where both CF rates and referral fees are
negotiable. This is because the latter regime lacks the advantage of uniform CF
rates for clients who do not need a referral since they (at least roughly) know
lawyers’ ranking. As explained in Section 3, the uniformity of CF rates facilitates
desirable matching despite clients’ acute information problem regarding the
value of their claim, the number of hours it might require, and so forth.
5.4 Unpaid-for referrals
Prohibiting referral fees altogether would eliminate the pitfalls of the current
system, but as indicated, would hardly serve clients’ interests or overall effi-
ciency, as it would result in lawyers handling cases they should preferably
transfer to more-qualified attorneys (Pauly, 1979; Parikh, 2001:120). If referring
lawyers were not allowed to charge a referral fee based on recovery, they might
also transfer the case to a lawyer who might not necessarily maximize the
expected recovery.
Even when fee splitting is permissible, many referrals are done for free
(Parikh, 2001; Kritzer, 2004:58-59). Lawyers may transfer a case to another
lawyer without asking for a referral fee because they believe charging such a
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fee is unethical, because the expected recovery is too small to bother with a
referral fee (in which case, fee splitting might also render the case unprofitable
for the handling lawyer), or as part of a strategy of encouraging reciprocal
referrals. Lawyers also refrain from charging a referral fee when the reason for
not handling the case by themselves is a conflict of interest (Parikh, 2001;
Kritzer, 2004:58-60). Higher-ranking lawyers may also refrain from charging a
fee when forwarding a case to a lower-ranking lawyer to avoid potential joint
responsibility for the quality of representation (in the absence of actual joint
handling of the case, such responsibility is a precondition for fee splitting under
Rule 1.5(e)(1) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2002)).
Absent fee splitting, the pitfalls of uniform or negotiable referral fees, such
as the reduction of the handling lawyer’s monetary incentive to attain the best
outcome, are eliminated. At the same time, so are the advantages of the paid-for
referrals system discussed above. Thus, a lawyer may choose to transfer a case
to her friend rather than to the best-available attorney (Spurr, 1988:91).
Considerations of reputation, relationships, and reciprocity may nevertheless
provide some alternative incentives for the transferor and the transferee to act
in the best interests of the client.
5.5 Uniformity of contingent-fee rates whether or not referral
fees are paid
Clearly, when the handling attorney splits the fee with the referring lawyer, her
share of the gross recovery is considerably lower than when she retains the
entire CF. The fact that clients who find the appropriate lawyer on their own and
clients who are transferred for no fee pay the same CF rate as clients who are
transferred for a referral fee is apparently inefficient and unfair. When a lawyer
charges a client who directly approached her or was referred to her for no fee
(hereinafter – a direct client) the same CF rate as a client who was referred to her
by another lawyer for a fee, the former client seems to cross-subsidize the latter.
Arguably, the transferred client purchases two services – referral and represen-
tation – for the same price the direct client pays for representation only. Not only
do these uniform charges seem unfair to the direct client, it has also been
claimed that they prove that the standard CF rate is supra-competitive due to
lawyers’ collusion (Brickman, 2003b:88-89; cf. Engstrom, 2011:865). Otherwise,
lawyers would charge direct clients lower CF rates than transferred ones.
Even if it were true that direct clients pay the same fee for fewer services
(representation without referral) it would not prove that the market is inefficient
due to lawyers’ behavior. It could be the result of the superior bargaining power
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of clients, which prevents lawyers from passing on the cost of the referral fee to
the transferred clients.19 Contrary to the basic assumption of the model offered
by Garicano and Santos (2004), in many cases (and probably most), the referring
lawyer does not have the power to transfer a case unless (a) the handling lawyer
has first examined and decided to accept it, and (b) the client has met with the
handling lawyer and agreed for her to take the case (Parikh, 2001:145, 155, 158).
If the handling lawyer were to ask the client for a higher-than-standard CF rate
to compensate for the referral fee, the client would likely look for another
attorney – now equipped with the knowledge that the case is rather lucrative.
Furthermore, while paid-for referrals yield lower net fees for the handling
lawyer, there are also considerable costs involved in attracting direct clients. To
build the type of reputation that would attract clients other than by referrals,
high-ranking firms have to employ marketing techniques such as holding press
conferences on important cases, writing editorials, nurturing amicable relation-
ships with former clients, and so forth (Parikh, 2001:165-166; on customer’s
referrals as a marketing technique, see generally Hada et al., 2010). The costs
involved in such activities may be rather substantial.
More fundamentally, the cross-subsidization argument is based on a mis-
conception about CF and referral practices. While it is true that transferred
clients pay the same CF rate as direct clients, the services the former get for,
say, two-ninths of the recovery (one-ninth effectively being paid to the referring
lawyer) are inferior to the services they would have received had they found a
suitable lawyer by themselves. This is because direct clients can hire a consider-
ably higher-ranking lawyer than clients referred for a referral fee. Where the
referral fee is one-third of the CF, had the client found the appropriate attorney
independently, she could have attained a lawyer whose reservation hourly fee
was 50% higher.20 Likewise, if the referral fee is one-half, by finding legal
19 Charging direct and transferred clients the same CF rate is analogous to a policy of uniform
spatial pricing, where a seller charges a uniform delivered price for its goods regardless of the
differences in transportation costs to customers in different locations. Such policy may be profit-
maximizing under certain assumptions regarding demand functions (Lederer, 2010). For
instance, if transferred clients are ordinarily poorer than direct ones – a plausible assumption
given that their recourse to the referral system indicates that they are less sophisticated and
knowledgeable – then the uniform pricing of the two populations may be a profit-maximizing
strategy.
20 Take, for example, a case whose expected value, pidi, is $270,000 and the number of hours
it requires, h, is 100. The expected fee under the standard one-third CF rate is $90,000. A client
who finds her own legal representation would hire an attorney whose reservation hourly fee, wi,
is $900. In contrast, a client with the same case, who approaches an unsuitable lawyer who
then transfers her case, can only expect a handling lawyer whose reservation hourly fee is
$600, as two-ninths of $270,000 is $60,000.
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representation on her own, the client could have obtained a lawyer whose
reservation hourly fee was 100% higher than that of the lawyer to whom she
was referred. It thus makes perfect sense that direct clients pay the handling
lawyer an effective net fee that is much higher than that paid by transferred
clients.
The pertinent comparison is not between the direct and transferred client of
a certain lawyer, but rather between the transferred client of Lawyer A and the
direct client of the far more-qualified Lawyer B. In all probability, the direct
client of the better lawyer receives correspondingly better representation, both
because she has the superior lawyer and because the one-third CF rate provides
her lawyer with a stronger incentive to attain a favorable outcome than the lower
effective CF rate of the transferred client. From the handling lawyer’s perspec-
tive, she is expected to attain the same effective hourly fee from both the direct
and the transferred client: either one-third of the recovery or two-ninths (given a
referral fee of one-third) of a proportionally larger recovery.
There is some empirical support for this analysis. Spurr (1988:93) found that
in his sample, the average recovery attained by high-quality lawyers in cases
referred to them by other lawyers was $113,224, while the average recovery
obtained in other cases was $84,070. That is, the average recovery in the
transferred cases was about 35% higher than in the direct cases. Based on
Spurr’s (1988:101) data, we calculated the average referral fee in his sample,
which was about 45%.21 Arguably, to earn the same effective hourly fee in the
two types of cases, given an average referral fee of 45%, the difference in the
average recovery should be considerably greater. However, if one assumes that
attaining direct cases involves considerable marketing costs, these findings
roughly accord with our analysis.
“Assortative matching” is thus a plausible solution not only to the unifor-
mity of CF rates puzzle but also to the apparent puzzle of uniform CF rates paid
by both transferred and direct clients.
6 Conclusion
Critics of the uniformity of CF rates and the current referral system sometimes
implicitly compare the present situation to one in which all clients and lawyers
are fully informed. This comparison is unhelpful, as many clients in the CF
21 Contrary to the prediction of his theoretical model, Spurr (1988:102-107) found no statisti-
cally significant correlation between the referral fee and gross recovery.
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market suffer from an acute shortage of information. Most single-shot personal-
injury plaintiffs are laypeople who are unable to evaluate the scope and merits
of their claim, the amount of work it will require, and the quality of lawyers.
These characteristics also make it highly unlikely that disclosure duties would
effectively solve their information problems.
This article assessed the common argument that the uniformity of CF rates
in the legal-services market is evidence of a market failure, possibly caused by
lawyers’ collusive practices. We claimed that the uniformity of CF rates does not
necessarily adversely affect clients’ interests or overall efficiency. Uniform CF
rates facilitate a desirable matching of cases and attorneys when clients know
lawyers’ ranking, even if they cannot bargain for an optimal contract because
they are unable to reliably assess the expected recovery and the scope of work
their case may require. When clients do not know lawyers’ ranking, desirable
matching is likely attained through the referral system, with or without referral
fees. When both CF rates and the referral fees are uniform, the referring lawyers,
who are aware of the ranking, play a similar role to that of a client who
possesses this information. Even when referral fees are negotiable, it is unclear
that the referral system, despite its pitfalls, is any worse than the alternatives,
such as banning or otherwise regulating referral fees, moving to negotiable CF
rates, or having non-lawyers broker legal services.
The upshot of our analysis is that, given clients’ inherent information
problem, the current combination of uniform CF rates and the referral system
is not a first-best solution. Nonetheless, it may well serve the interests of clients,
and is not necessarily less desirable in terms of social welfare than other market
schemes. Whether one is interested in overall efficiency or in enhancing clients’
interests, the very uniformity of CF rates thus does not establish the case for
regulating these rates or the CF market more generally. Since some clients know
lawyers’ ranking and thus benefit from the uniformity of CF rates, and others
may not know how reliable their information is (and hence may or may not
discover that they can benefit from a referral), moving to negotiable CF rates
may adversely affect clients as a group.
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